

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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CLASSIFICATION

SEP 14 1953

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE

ATTN: Chief of Base, Pilsach

FROM Chief, KE

SUBJECT GENERAL Operational  
SPECIFIC German Overtures to GUTCHER Representatives in Egypt

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1. The following are highlights of a lengthy ORACED Cairo dispatch, dated 7 August 1953, regarding recent efforts on the part of certain of the German advisors in Egypt to cultivate senior GUTCHER representatives in Cairo.

A. It seems that during the past few weeks, the senior GUTCHER officer in Cairo has been courted by several members of the German military mission and the German Embassy. Owing to the number of these contacts, which have been purely social, the GUTCHER officer has been at a loss to discern the reasons underlying these recent German overtures. However, the evening of 11 July 1953 at a large dinner party given by (Major) Georg Gerhard MEYER, German interests were somewhat clarified by one other than Dr. Wilhelm VOSS, chief of the German advisory group in Egypt. According to the GUTCHER officer's account of the evening, VOSS took his aside and in the presence of (Colonel) Kurt FREYER, Ministerial Director and Karl Hans WILKE, informed him that he had been asked by a leading official of the Egyptian Government to discuss a matter of "importance" to GUTCHER. In this connection, VOSS also let it be known that this dinner party had been specifically approved by the office of the Egyptian director of Military Intelligence.

B. It seems, VOSS adds, that Egypt is prepared to settle the Canal Zone issue and immediately join a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) provided Great Britain and the "western countries" agree to:

1. Evacuation of British troops
2. Substantial military aid and modernization of Egyptian Armed Forces
3. British proclamation of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal Zone

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4. Establishment of a "joint committee" to handle the technical administration of the Suez Base. VOSS described this committee as the nucleus of the future MEDO High Command. The ODIERI officer expressed polite interest while VOSS re-emphasized the high position of "his source". VOSS also emphasized that he and his German colleagues are most anxious to see the "urgent" Suez problem solved and the establishment of MEDO. He urged that the ODIERI officer not underestimate the importance of his information.

C. VOSS then turned to another matter of common concern. He said that he was disturbed by verified reports that Moscow is sending a considerable number of Russian - Moslem students through the USSR Legation in Cairo to attend courses at Al Azhar University. He has promised to keep the ODIERI officer informed regarding the activities of these Russian students who, he believes, are being used as agents.

D. In addition to VOSS, FERNEL, MULLER and BOKLE, chief of the Artillery and anti-Tank Branch, the following Germans attended the "MEXICO" dinner party: Mr. HANSON, military rank and present assignment unknown; Karl STIDEL, wartime ECO and assistant paratroop instructor; Alfred DITTMAS, military rank and present assignment unknown; and Col. W. BIERCK, German engineer who allegedly commanded a German Division towards the end of the War.

E. At the suggestion of an OMAGIE officer, the ODIERI officer met again with VOSS on 4 August for the sole purpose of obtaining the identity of the Egyptian official who had planted this proposal for a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian problem with VOSS. VOSS identified his source as Mr. Mahmud FAWZI, Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom he confers frequently. He explained that FAWZI had summoned him to his office on 31 July; that they had discussed the Suez problem and, finally, that he, VOSS, had managed to get across his idea for a "joint committee" which FAWZI took up with enthusiasm and now claims as his own. VOSS claims that FAWZI indicated that the Egyptian Government cannot initiate conversations with the British and so he passed it to VOSS for delivery to OMAGIE representatives in Cairo.

F. This 4 August interview then deteriorated into a lengthy discourse covering VOSS' views on the Anglo-Egyptian problem, Israeli-Arab League relations, the "general situation" in Germany, Germans in Syria, and the situation in Egypt. Briefly, VOSS deplares the fate of former Hitler Youth and German army officers under 40 who lack a "career" and find no hope in the Adenauer Government. VOSS wants the "western world" to assist West Germany in developing a system and psychology which can appeal to those men who represent the future leaders of Germany.

G. VOSS is not satisfied with "the way things are going in Syria". But, he prefers Col. KRIEBEL, present chief of the German Mission, to the original chief, POSTALL, whom he describes as a bad neo-Nazi character.

H. As for the Egyptian scene, VOSS dislikes PAVLAN, says Bonn is dissatisfied and expects a new Ambassador will be appointed. On the other hand, he respects Baron Dietrich von MIRBACH, Counselor of the German Embassy.

I. At the moment he is extremely concerned about the fate of Col. Herbert BOENIGT, Col. Kurt FERNEL and Maj. Gerhard Georg MERTENS and himself. VOSS told the ONIEX officer that he has received "most secret" information from Bonn indicating that the British and Americans (in part) are responsible for "actions" against these persons. He is particularly displeased that the Egyptian Government, without referring to him as usual, has failed to remove the contract of Col. BOENIGT, "wartime chief of the Maffin Officers Personnel Bureau". VOSS regards him as a capable and good officer and intends to look into this case. He believes the culprit may be Lt. Col. Albert NEUMANN, who is the "only pre-Communist" among the German advisors in Egypt. VOSS plans to get rid of NEUMANN at the earliest opportunity.

J. He has also learned that Washington and Bonn have specifically asked for MERTENS' recall and both Washington and London have asked for FERNEL's return to Germany. VOSS has disapproved this action against FERNEL whom he describes as a "good officer, extremely anti-Communist, who worked hard for the U.S. Historical Group and served with the U.S. German Labor Force in Germany after the war".

K. In passing, VOSS also referred to Maj. Gen. Oskar KNEBEL, "one of the few German Generals who was not a member of the General Staff, a real tank expert, excellent man who aspires to the position of Inspector of the Armed Forces in the future German Army."

L. The ONIEX officer then mentioned that he had met Col. Hans Georg RICHART several days before. VOSS' reaction was that RICHART, advisor to the Egyptian General Staff on organization, is a "difficult" person. He says RICHART is a "Prussian" officer who issues unnecessary orders which the Egyptians resent. He thinks RICHART is "too anxious to get ahead".

2. So much for VOSS' commentary on his colleagues in Egypt. In forwarding the ONIEX officer's reports, the senior ONIEX representative in Cairo appended his own comments, which illuminate VOSS' peculiar views. The following is a brief resume of the ONIEX officer's remarks:

4. Information from other sources does not indicate that the officers of the ROC are prepared to discuss MEDO, even tentatively, with the British. In fact, the Egyptians take every opportunity publicly to denounce this idea.

5. It is difficult to discern the precise motivation of the German experts and the German diplomatic mission in their efforts to insert themselves in the Anglo-Egyptian settlement. However, one interpretation might be that the German experts are anxious to hang on to their jobs in Egypt. They foresee the possibility that the British and Egyptians might reach some sort of an agreement. In this event the British and/or the Americans might agree to equip and train the Egyptian Armed Forces and the Germans might lose their contracts. Therefore, in line with this view, albeit speculation, the Germans are trying to establish rapport with the Americans and British who, will be grateful for their pre-war Eastern counsel to the Egyptians, and leave them in their present jobs until they are called to duty in a West German Army. It is noted that all of the German officers who have talked to ONYOKI representatives in Egypt have expressed a desire to return to their military careers.

6. VOSS' claim that he advanced the idea of a "joint committee" so adversely to Foreign Minister FAKELI that the latter believes it to be his own is ridiculous. The ONYOKI officer knows him to be a man "who does his own thinking."

7. Finally, FAKELI is regarded by his Western colleagues as "genuinely" pro-West but lacking in action and consequently will not be taken into their confidence. They believe FAKELI would like to assume the role of mediator between the Egyptians and the Western Powers.

8. It is hoped that you will find this seemingly tedious report as interesting as we have. We would like to have your comments along with any data you may uncover on German advisors not mentioned in previous correspondence.

**Distribution:**

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